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In an attempt to make sense1 of the world, Jean-Luc Nancy writes in The 
Sense of the World, one of the most abyssal paragraphs possible: 
 
I would like here to open up an exploration of the space that is 
common to all of us, that makes up our community: the space of the 
most extended generality of sense, at once as a distended, desolate 
extension—the desert that grows—and as a broadly open, available 
extension, one that we sense to be an urgency, necessity, or 
imperative. This common space is infinitely slight. It is nothing but the 
limit that separates and mixes at once the in-significance that arises 
out of the pulverization of significations and the archi-significance 
encountered by the need of being-towards-the-world. This limit 
separates and mixes the most common, most banal of senses—the 
evident inconsistency of the justification of our lives—and the most 
singular, the evident necessity of the least fragment of existence as of 
the world toward which it exists.2 
 
Let me begin by trying to make sense of this dense paragraph: on the 
one hand, there is a distended and desolate extension of sense and non-
sense (‘in-significance’), created by the pulverization of significations. On 
the other hand, as it were, there is an open and available extension (of) 
archi-sense (‘archi-significance’) stemming from the need to be towards the 
world.3 With this juxtaposition, Nancy is not interested in pitching one facet 
of the world (the in-significance of the world) against the other (the archi-
significance of the need of being-towards-the-world).4 He is interested in 
thinking the common limit that paradoxically brings together and yet also 
separates the two apart. This common limit is not something that can be 
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singled out, objectified, analyzed, dissected, and discarded. It is a multi-
faceted liminal operation that, as Nancy says, knows no stable referent and 
yet still manages to generate the world.5 
 
But what is the point of focusing on such an abyssal and liminal 
operation that, evidently, takes place every second of time? As is well 
known, Nancy’s aim is not to provide yet another picture of the world, but to 
actually embody its making, its creation; that is, in one Heideggerian 
expression: to work out how the world ‘worlds.’6 How is one to make sense 
of the way the world ‘worlds’? Could the ‘worlding’ of the world be this 
common limit or double extension (in-significance/archi-significance)? If 
yes, how is one then to make sense of this liminal operation that is curiously 
at once ontological and ontical? Finally, but most importantly, once we 
make sense of this limit, how can we affect it politically so that it escapes its 
very own annihilation? These are the questions that will be addressed in 
this essay. The aim is not to present once again an exhaustive overview of 
Nancy’s interpretation of the world or its relationship to the three Abrahamic 
religions. There is enough scholarship already on that topic.7 The aim is 
instead to evaluate the political potential of this liminal operation ‘made up’ 
of in-significance and archi-significance. This does not mean that what 
follows will demonstrate how Nancy’s work can be seen to have a political 
agenda. 8  This simply means that Nancy’s interpretation of the world 
perhaps gives us a radically new political potential for the world: to politically 
embody, what he overall calls the stance of the world. 
 
In order to address this aim, the following essay will first explore the 
sense of the world, the way it makes sense to us, especially as it is 
understood when the word ‘globalization’ is mentioned. This will reveal a 
slightly different reading of globalization. 9  Globalization is usually 
understood as a ‘uni-totality’ 10  ruled by a de-regulated set of markets 
(commodities, capital, and labor) that has over the years partially phased 
out all unitary systems, including the nation-state.11 However, if one focuses 
on the political dimension of Nancy’s thought, a different understanding of 
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globalization comes about, one which curiously, and contrary to what many 
believe does not come across as specifically alter-mondialiste,12 as if he 
were an advocate fighting to go ‘beyond’ globalization. As the prefatory note 
to his book, The Creation of the World 13  clearly intimates, Nancy’s 
understanding of the world is much more nuanced, taking, both, the world 
and globalization, it’s archi-signification and its deepening in-signification, 
into account. The second section will elaborate on this stance or liminal 
operation (in-significance/archi-significance), by exploring how Nancy 
pushes the argument further with the crucially split word im-mundus. With 
this split word, Nancy brings together this double extension or liminal 
operation. Im-mundus will be the way we create and produce the world, a 
gesture that stems paradoxically from out of no-thing and yet is some-thing 
that is with and without reason. With this approach, this essay will hope to 
show that Nancy’s attempt to expose the liminal stance of the world is an 
eminently political gesture that helps us to reopen, as he says, ‘each 
possible struggle for a world,’14  and in the process to fight against this 
pernicious growth of the wasteland, to recall Nietzsche’s famous cry.15 
 
1. Globalization 
 
A World At and As the End 
 
Globe, global, globalizing, globalization, globality: all these words have 
the same Latin root: globus: round mass, sphere, ball. The main 
characteristic of such etymological root is that, however divergent their 
meanings, all of the derivatives assume a circumscribed whole. They all 
associate the word ‘globalization’ with the spherical shape of the earth as if 
the two were necessarily mutually dependent. The shape of anything 
related to globus, and by extension, the shape of globalization is therefore 
always—in most people’s minds, at least—a physically limited round thing. 
However, if one discards the cliché juxtaposition earth/globe and imagines 
another shape, the limit of this shape suddenly becomes problematic: what 
shape does globalization have? How is one to understand a limit to 
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globalization? Even if one can identify a limit, what would make it remain 
stable and/or comprehensible not just ‘once and for all,’ but at least for the 
time it is articulated? Furthermore, if the solar system, the galaxy, and the 
universe are not what constitute an outside, then what exterior is really 
conjured up when thinking the limits of what is global? Is there such a thing 
as a non-globalized world? The questions about the limits of globalization 
abound, but the answers are always short in coming.16 This lack of answers 
shows that when it comes to the idea of globalization, it is always the very 
idea of limit that is effectively put in question.  
 
Considering the fact that it is always un-ascribable, this question of 
limit is perhaps that of an end creating itself. Globalization knows no limit 
because it spends its time shaping its own end. Although one cannot 
escape this sense entirely, this ending is not apocalyptic. This ending 
effectively refers to an always-postponed achievement. It is the process of 
the creation of the end itself.17 Nancy talks about this at length when he 
references our globalized and technologized world. He writes, for example, 
“the world is always a ‘creation’: a tekné with neither principle nor end nor 
material other than itself.” 18  In this way, far from simply revealing the 
integration of markets, nation-states, cultures, identities, and, technologies, 
globalization exposes ourselves to the creation of the end of the world, 
whereby we are exposed to the endpoint at which the globe as a 
‘comprehensible’ achievement (social, cultural, political, economic, and so 
on) creates itself. The curious consequence of this ever renewed ending is 
that in the process, globalization allows itself to be perceived as an object of 
analysis.19 This does not revert back to the idea of globalization as a round 
object floating in space. Globalization becomes an object because, in the 
process of creating itself as the end, globalization figures itself as ‘an object 
that ends.’ In this process, globalization therefore continuously offers itself 
as an object that curiously isn’t ‘one.’ It achieves itself as what is effectively 
incapable of achievement. As Christina Smerick rightly says, ‘Globalization 
is not merely an economic situation regarding trade and popular culture. 
Globalization is making One of the world, which is not one.’20 There would 
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be no worldwide discussion about this controversial term if this were not the 
case. 
 
This has a further consequence: in order for it to be perceived as ‘an 
object,’ globalization also, inevitably, projects an imaginary outside 
perspective. The imaginary aspect of this projection is here important 
because what ends cannot extricate itself from this end; it can only imagine 
it can do so. In other words, the process of globalization can only offer itself 
if it imagines an end to the process itself, even though there is no evidence 
for it. In this way, and this is the crucial aspect of this consequence, 
globalization is entirely structured in the dependency of metaphysics or, 
more precisely, in the dependency of onto-theology to make sense. In other 
words, and however much it is tied to the process of ending, globalization 
imagines that one can stand outside of it and look at it as a comprehensive 
whole as if a God or an alien. But if one discards gods and aliens, how is 
one to understand this onto-theological status? What gives globalization its 
slippery representational power? 
 
The Rule of Tautologies 
 
In his book Dis-enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, Jean-
Luc Nancy provides us with one of the most comprehensive analyses of the 
link between globalization and its onto-theological context.  He says the 
following:  
 
We know—how could we ignore this—that the threefold monotheism 
of a threefold religion of the Book (with which one could associate 
ancient Manichaeism, as well) defines a Mediterraneo-European 
particularity and, from there, diverse forms of global expansion… 
Globalization is, as I understand it, in more than one respect a 
globalization of monotheism in one or another of its forms.21  
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In other words, globalization is the result not only of the global expansion of 
Abraham’s three Religions, but also, and perhaps above all, of the 
monotheic aspect of these religions. If one accepts Nancy’s link, and 
therefore the intricate relationship between these one-god religions and 
globalization, then the question that immediately springs to mind is this: 
what exactly brings together the secular process of globalization that we 
know today, and the monotheic aspect of these three millennial religions? 
Nancy answers this question by telling us that what links globalization and 
monotheism is the tautological nature of its principal value. In the case of 
religion, the principle value is God and its unique tautological sense: God = 
God. In other words, nothing can replace God and nothing can compare to 
Him. He is ‘One’ and as such He reigns alone and has no rival. With 
regards to globalization, the principle value is money in its tautological 
sense: money = money. In other words, no other value can replace the 
value of money. Money reigns supreme and nothing, not even bartering, 
can be used in its place. 22  In this way, the relationship between 
globalization and the monotheism of Abraham’s three religions is the value 
attributed overall to the mono-valence of its absolute values23: God and/or 
money. But how is one to understand this concretely? 
 
Tautological Mono-valences 
 
Karl Marx tells us that a general equivalency is achieved when a 
relative social mono-valence (in his case, money, but with Nancy, both 
money and God) is given an abstract value that supersedes all others. 
There is therefore a general equivalence when one symbol or one 
commodity is excluded from all others and is subsequently used in order to 
regulate what is left behind as unelected. Marx argues that: ‘a particular 
kind of commodity acquires the character of general equivalent, because all 
other commodities make it the material in which they uniformly express their 
value.’ 24  The singled out mono-valence or commodity is the one that 
functions as the general equivalent regulating all exchanges. This means 
that nothing can effectively equate, replace, or disturb the worldwide reign 
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of tautologies known as God or money. They stand for the only language 
referents able to mediate and regulate all other exchanges within language. 
They are the general equivalents of all other terms in the system.25 
 
Nancy draws three main consequences from the prevalence accorded 
to these tautological mono-valences: First consequence: it inevitably implies 
a leveling of all distinctions. As he says in the context of an analysis of 
democracy: ‘The democratic world developed in the context—to which it is 
linked from the origin—of general equivalence. This expression—from 
Marx—designates… the general leveling of all distinctions and the reduction 
of all forms of excellence through mediocratization.’26 This should not be 
understood as a lament for hierarchies or quasi-religious orders. This 
should be understood simply as the impossibility of seeing beyond the 
reference to a general equivalence. Everything, from procreation to death 
and from inorganic events to natural disasters,27 is regulated by a reference 
to these incalculable mono-valences. Once regulated by them, there are no 
more distinctions; everything becomes secondary, mediocre. The second 
consequence is that globalization can only be a homogeneous traffic that 
results in a fundamentalism of values. In other words, in a situation where 
there are only two mono-valences and nothing distinguishes itself outside of 
the value attributed by these mono-valences, everything becomes torn 
apart by secular and/or religious fundamentalisms. As Nancy says:  
 
‘Value returns eternally, precisely because it has no price… This is 
why our homogeneous world presents evaluation now as an 
equivalence of mercantile value, now as one entailing the sacrifice of 
existence to a supreme omnipotence. It is always a traffic. It is always 
one fundamentalism of value against another: one value being valued 
as a fundamental, a principle measure, God or money, spiritual or 
stock-market value.’28  
 
There is therefore no way to exclude or excuse ourselves from these ever-
prevalent mono-valences. This lack of alternative leaves us stranded ‘in a 
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traffic’ with the bank or with heaven; a situation that drives, for example, 
many of us to become wage-slaves and/or fundamentalists (religious and/or 
secular).   
 
Stuck in a perpetual homogeneous traffic, we become (final 
consequence) a multitude in a pluriverse that prevents us from uniting and 
acting together. Going against authors such as Hardt and Negri,29 Nancy 
retorts that a ‘multitude’ disperses everyone into individual singularities, 
thus failing to assemble around a common effort. In an article for the 
communist newspaper L’Hummanité, Nancy, for example, wonders;  
 
‘whether [this] dispersion (and therefore the use of the word 
“multitude”) is not precisely due to the rampant globalization imposed 
by capitalism, which the anti-globalization movement is trying to 
denounce… “Multitude”… multiplies individuals and small groups, but 
not in the sense of an increase, propelled by a force, for example. It 
multiplies individuals as if all of them were caught in a type of 
errancy.’30  
 
The argument is clear: globalization leaves us stranded in a ‘pluri- or ‘multi-
verse’ that has lost all political agency and potential.31 Stuck in endless 
traffic, a devout or a slave to one, or both, of these two ever-prevalent 
mono-valences, we become, as Hannah Arendt remarked a long time 
ago,32 isolated and unable to come together, form groups or coalitions. We 
all err alone with our tablets and androids, solitary social networkers of 
multi-verses. 
 
The Unworld (Non-Sense33) and the World (Sense) 
 
The overall outcome of this view of the process of globalization (as a 
pluri-verse scattered throughout with errant singularities caught in an 
endless traffic regulated by two monovalences) is, as Nancy says, in one 
formidable word: the unworld [immundus or l’immonde]. The unworld is not 
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just what is unclean, it is also and above all, what does not belong to the 
world. Globalization leads us to the unworld, that is, to what is not a world. 
Here again, it is crucial to understand that, although contrasted, the unworld 
and the world are not engaged in a dialectical battle as if opposite forces. 
As Nancy clearly says, ‘one must not oppose the world and the unworld.’34 
For him, the two take place not against each other, but simultaneously in 
the creation and destruction of the world. If they were understood against 
each other, then, the unworld would oppose itself to the world, and 
everyone would wish the world to absorb the unworld (i.e. recycle it). As 
Nancy says in Corpus35:  
 
‘The world of bodies is shared with and divided by immundus. 
Identically. This isn’t a simple dialectical respiration form the “same” to 
the “other,” finally gathering up the trash and sublimating or recycling 
it. In this world and its creation, something exceeds and twists the 
cycles. (…Neither our bodies nor the world are circular, and 
ecotechnical creation’s most serious law is not to come full circle.)’36 
 
However malignant it may be the process of globalization takes place as the 
world exceeds itself; an excess that can never reabsorb itself. We 
encounter here something crucial, but rarely highlighted in the many 
commentaries on Nancy’s work. There is indeed a strange parallel between 
globalization and what Nancy calls ‘world-forming’ (mondialisation). This 
parallel shows that neither comes full circle, both exceed each other, thus 
never allowing for sense (world-forming) to make absolute sense or for non-
sense (globalization) to end in either a parousia of (scientific) meaning, or 
total annihilation. In this way, there is no escaping this impossibility to 
recycle properly because creation is what goes radically beyond the logic of 
production (and therefore recycling), and, yet, the possibility of this 
production never leaves the horizon of creation. The two always go together 
while always exceeding themselves. This is not a circular thought; it is the 
facticity of thought itself, that is to say, it is the facticity of the world itself. In 
this way, there is no pure creation or world-formation as such. There is an 
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exposure or opening that both creates and for good or bad also produces. It 
creates by emptying itself (the nihil creating or, as we have seen, the 
available extension archi-signification), and it produces not as a positive 
positioning, but as spacing (the desolate extension of in-significance) and 
this with no possibility of hypostasis as the moment-point where this spacing 
or extension can be identified. This is what allows Nancy to write about the 
‘nothing growing as something,’37 that is, as an object that, in the end, can 
be analyzed as such. In other words, there is a void emptying itself and, in 
the process, produces the world as we know it. Through such a liminal 
operation (i.e. this creation / production-without-positioning or globalizing-
world-forming), the world becomes, as Nancy says, in another formidable 
juxtaposition of words: a subject-reject38 [un sujet-de-rejet] or im-mundus, 
the latter crucially hyphenated in order to distinguish it from the unworld, i.e. 
immundus. As he says:  
 
‘A body expels itself: as corpus, as spasmic space, distended, subject-
reject [sujet-de-rejet], “im-mundus” if we have to keep the word. But 
that’s how this world takes place.’39  
 
In other words, the unworld (immundus in one word) comes as the world 
forms itself (mundus): Im-mundus (hyphenated). The word im-mundus is 
now crucially open: the world is at once a globalizing phenomenon and a 
world forming itself; an odd juxtaposition that can only be allergic to both 
sublation and deconstruction, precisely because it is the facticity of the self-
de-construction of the world. The consequence of this crucial juxtaposition 
of words and therefore of this view of globalization/world-formation, is that 
Nancy is not asking us, as is so often mistakenly commented upon, to 
choose between globalization and world-formation (i.e. between immundus 
or mundus).40 He is simply asking us to take both into consideration (im-
mundus). Again as he says: ‘The intrication of world and filth [du monde et 
de l’immonde] cannot be, for us, either disintricated or dissimulated.’ 41 
Beyond the impossibility of recycling, the reason is simple: neither world-
forming nor globalization are ‘destinies’ as such; they are stances. One 
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fabricates; the other creates.42 One can be (just about) represented, the 
other cannot. The two sustain each other in their own stance. This is the 
only way the stance of the world can make sense, is sense. There would be 
no authors such as Jean-Luc Nancy, and there would be no commentators 
on his work happily engaging in the eco-technology of books, if this were 
not the case. The sense they impart is our sense. 
 
This impossibility of disintricating one from the other is precisely what 
makes the world to ‘world.’ Caught in an endless traffic ruled by a couple of 
general equivalences, our ‘growth takes care of itself’43; we take care of 
ourselves and the only way we can do this is to both create and produce, 
that is, to participate in the creation of the world and of its globalized eco-
technological productions. There cannot be an alternative because the un-
reflective and un-recyclable stances of the world do not allow it. And this is 
precisely what leads us to erase the world, that is, paradoxically to create a 
world that is always already not the world, i.e. not yet: immundus. With 
Nancy, the world as we conceive it today does not just slowly wither into 
nonsense (as in Heidegger44), and it does not just space us apart (as in 
Arendt); it remains, together, in-significance and archi-significance, subject-
reject: im-mundus, open. As Christina Smerick rightly points out, inflecting 
the argument perhaps too optimistically: the structure that produces the 
nightmare—globalization—is also the structure that produces hope. 45 
Inevitably, the question that arises as a result is this: Now that we have 
discarded the possibility of an alternative (globalization as an inevitable 
socio-economic process that either benefits or harms the world, depending 
on the perspective or mondialisation as a creation ex-nihilo that exceeds the 
transcendental conditions of possibility of representation), how is one to 
understand the stance of this subject-reject, this im-mundus or globalizing-
world-forming?  
 
 
2. Im-Mundus 
 
 12 
A New Non Equivalence 
 
Nancy’s attempt to think a liminal subject-reject or im-mundus consists 
in fact in trying to find a new non-equivalence 46 : the always renewed 
affirmation of a unique, incomparable, and un-substitutable ‘sense’ that 
would be proper to im-mundus, that is, proper to a world that perhaps for 
the first time asks itself whether it is worth saving, or more precisely, 
saluting in a Derridean sense. How is one to understand this ‘properness’ 
based on a radical non-equivalence? Nancy writes: 
 
‘The challenge is thus to introduce a new non-equivalence that would 
have nothing to do, of course, with the non-equivalence of feudalisms 
or aristocracies, or of regimes of divine election or salvation, or of 
spiritualities, heroisms, or aestheticisms, etc. It would not be a matter 
of introducing another system of differential values; it would be a 
matter of finding, of achieving a sense of evaluation, of evaluative 
affirmation, that gives to each evaluating gesture—a decision of 
existence, of work, of bearing—the possibility of not being measured in 
advance by a given system but of being on the contrary, each time the 
affirmation of a unique, incomparable un-substitutable “value” or 
“sense.” Only this can displace what is called economic domination, 
which is but the effect of the fundamental decision for equivalence.’47 
 
The proposal is clear: the world needs a sense of evaluation that does not 
foster further traffic and fundamentalism, but gives experience a kind of 
value that is free of onto-theological constraints. The challenge is to give 
each human gesture the possibility of not being made into a commodity, or 
being tied to an absolute. Furthermore, the challenge is to give experience 
the chance of affirming itself as its own evaluation.48 This new value is not 
intended either to create a new realm (in this world or another), or to 
(re)discover the unity immanent to the world, as if there could be some 
underlining sense to a fragmented multiplicity. 49  The value to be found 
should be that of the sense of our own im-mundus, subject-reject. 
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The reason Nancy insists so much on sense (and specifically the 
sense of im-mundus) is because, as he says, ‘there is no longer a back-
world [un arrière-monde] as Nietzsche would say’ 50  that would 
metaphorically give sense to (or guarantee the meaning of) our existence. 
In other words, the reason we need to focus on sense is because we need 
to make sense for ourselves, as subject-rejects of our own im-mundus. We 
can no longer afford to create meaning only to latch it on one or two 
peerless mono-valences. God and money need to be thought not otherwise, 
but for the first time without guarantees, that is, unhinged from their 
assumed tautological truths. As such, this new value must be not only 
allergic to any kind of trafficking, it must also be without measure (absolute 
or otherwise). As Nancy says, referring to Georges Bataille’s non-productive 
expenditures:  
 
‘Value must have value without measure. Bataille expressed this by 
calling value “heterogeneous”: The homogenous is the exchange of 
values, a general equivalence. In order to have value properly, it is 
necessary that value be heterogeneous to that equivalence… The 
heterogeneous is not a matter of usage or of exchange, it is a matter 
of experience.’51  
 
Unique and unrepeatable, untradeable and unpreservable, the sense of im-
mundus is therefore a general economy—in a Bataillean sense—that must 
risk itself in all its radical heterogeneity. This risk is incalculable because it 
is ‘external to all numeration, to any counting’52 and this is precisely the 
measure of this in-significance / archi-significance that is im-mundus. 
 
The extraordinary consequence of this vision is that the sense of this 
heterogeneity is effectively worth nothing. The new non-equivalence can 
have neither an absolute value (God), nor an incomparable value (money). 
This does not mean that this new non-equivalence is worthless, something 
that can only be discarded because it cannot be compared to God or 
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exchanged with or for money. The subject is not just a reject; it still retains 
itself as subject. Im-mundus is not just immundus; it is also mundus. As 
such, the sense of im-mundus is its own worth. As Nancy says:  
 
‘[A] heterogeneous value is worth nothing, or it is worth what the 
“valent” [valoir] in itself is worth: an exposure to some measure when 
that measure is but the other of all measure, or its infinity in act.’53  
 
In this way, the sense of im-mundus or subject-reject is effectively a 
heterogeneity that knows no equivalent and, indisputably, no price-tag. This 
does not refer to the banal fact that life has no price (while knowing all along 
that this life can be traded, bartered, or insured, for example). This refers 
instead to the happenstance of a heterogeneity that is indeed worth nothing 
or is its own worth. 
 
To Desire to Remain in Desire 
 
But how can anyone make sense of this im-mundus, at once the 
process of globalization and that of world-forming, without automatically re-
absorbing it as some ‘thing’ with an onto-theological value? What concrete 
example can one choose to make sense of this non-sense (of the world, of 
existence) whose heterogeneity never allows it to have any worth in the 
conventional sense of the term? In order to make sense of this, it is 
necessary to go back to the way Nancy re-articulates Heidegger’s 
understanding of Being. He writes: 
 
‘To the letter of Heidegger’s texts, one could not substitute being with 
world. However, in spirit, things are different… [For Heidegger,] being 
is, in one word, a verb. Being is no longer Being or a being, but “to be,” 
that is, a transitive verb: to be Being. Heidegger formulates this 
transitive request with the use of a non-grammatical expression. He 
also formulates it (in What is philosophy?) by giving a kind of 
equivalence: being takes (legein, logos) Being. I would prefer to 
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formulate this transcription or translation differently. I would say that to 
be desires Being… To be is thus simply this: let it be [que l’étant est]. 
Being is being: tautology in which Being resolves itself in being.’54 
 
The difference is here clearly exposed: instead of the tautological ‘being 
takes Being’ with which the early Heidegger ends his existential analyses, 
Nancy proposes to focus instead on the way ‘to be’ desires Being. The 
focus on desire is an attempt to ex-pose concretely the sense of existence 
or im-mundus. Desire is a crucial expression, because it is that which is 
sought after, coveted, called for. It is a movement; the movement of the 
conatus: desire for Being/World. But the question remains: how could one 
desire without automatically appropriating it as need? In other words, how 
can one create the world without also effectively letting globalization 
produce it as yet more meaningful/less surplus atomizing us even more? In 
the end, we all want something, so how can one desire something other 
than general equivalence, that is, more money, more God? Nancy answers 
these questions in this way:  
 
‘How does one name the object of a desire that is not a general 
equivalence? I call it “sense,” but I will also name it “desire”: we desire 
to remain in desire, in the tension towards… in the leap. This is the 
only way there can be something beyond equivalence.’55  
 
The world thus desires the world. The subject-reject thus desires itself as 
subject through its own rejection. Again, this is not a theme for thought. Im-
mundus is a thrust or a throw, but not in the sense whereby we would go 
from one place to another. It is an unpredictable surge that can only be 
understood or heard, as Nancy says in Manchev’s interview above, with the 
saying, ‘let there be’ [que l’étant est].56 This expression does not refer to the 
biblical fiat (as in fiat lux: ‘let there be light’) because no dispelling of 
ignorance is implied. Que l’étant est implies being’s surge in being-ness (as 
Nancy says in French: ‘que l’étant en étant cherche et accroît en même 
temps son étantité’57). However this does not simply take place at a pure 
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ontological level. It also occurs in being’s embodiment, the way the body 
surges in its bodily or material form. As such, it describes the embodiment 
of our very own stance or that of the world, as we know it. The expression 
‘let there be’ therefore refers to a fact, the stance of the world or globe, an 
excess of significance and insignificance sustained [sous-tendue], by an 
archi-significance that desires to remain in desire. This is what concretely 
takes place here, now, ‘in’ this globalized world-forming or being/Being, and 
this without necessarily staining or straining it with metaphysical meaning.  
 
A Demand for Reason 
 
But let’s push this further and ask: how does this thrust maintain itself? 
In other words, how can anything whatsoever sustain itself in this manner? 
An answer to these questions is precisely what should give us the general 
stance of im-mundus; the way im-mundus desires to remain in desire, the 
way globalization and the world ex-pose themselves without referring to any 
given principle, nor to any assigned end by an outside or inside value.58 
Nancy writes:  
 
‘The world is… a fact: it may well be that it is the only fact of this kind 
(if it is the case that the other facts take place within the world). It is a 
fact without reason or end, and it is our fact. To think it, is to think this 
factuality, which implies not referring it to a meaning capable of 
appropriating it, but to placing in it, in its truth as a fact, all possible 
meaning.’59  
 
This is not a banal forensic thought: ‘let’s focus on the facts not on 
interpretations or reactions.’ Nancy is a concrete thinker; the factuality of im-
mundus is its sense, its non-equivalence, what desires sense, including 
interpretations and reactions. But how do we place im-mundus in its truth as 
a fact? 
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Once again, when it comes to the factuality of im-mundus, Heidegger’s 
influence on Nancy’s thought is unmistakable.60 This is particularly acute 
when reference is made to Heidegger’s Principle of Reason. In order to 
demonstrate that there is something without reason or entirely its own 
reason, Nancy, like Heidegger, quotes from the spiritual poem of Angelus 
Silesius, The Cherubic Wanderer: Sensual Description of the Four Final 
Things; the famous line taken from that text being, ‘the rose grows without 
reason.’61 The crux of Nancy’s argument is that as soon as there is world, 
there is a demand for reason; there is a demand to frame or limit the world 
as vision, as globe, as a globalizing phenomenon. But before this demand, 
the appearance of the world itself, like that of the rose, is without reason. 
Heidegger argues the same thing when he says that, ‘the character of the 
demand to render, the reddendum, belongs to reason,’62 while the rose and 
the world pay no attention to itself, asks not whether it needs a reason. 
Accordingly, humans are the animal rationale, the creatures that require 
accounts (and in the process globalize their world-formation); they ‘are the 
reckoning creature,’63 reckoning understood in the broad sense of the word 
ratio. In this way, world-forming comes to be experienced not as something 
rendered (by God or a Leibnizian principle of reason, for example), but as a 
demand that always gives accounts of the world as globe. Im-mundus is 
thus at once without reason (like the rose) and (unlike the rose) a demand 
for reason that can never be properly rendered (again). This does not easily 
justify or equate globalization with nature (the unworld, like a weed, spreads 
and nothing can be done to prevent it), and it does not reabsorb everything 
under human agency (humans are the only reckoning creatures on earth). 
Neither reason nor ground sustains mundus, and, yet, mundus demands, 
even commands its global account, its immundus,64 for example with this 
demanding question: what is one to do with this globalized world? This 
explains why the world, as world, as the whole of what appears (always 
multiple, open, un-totalisable) is concrete, which means that it never 
explains itself as it deploys itself, never presents itself as a factual 
intelligible necessity. As Nancy says in a recent collaborative book with 
Arelien Barrau, ‘the world never matches its “being-thought.”’65 
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Without Grasp 
 
There is no doubt that Nancy’s understanding of the world and of 
globalization is unique inasmuch as it never allows itself to veer into a fixed 
interpretation of the topic. The world and the globe never cease to defy 
themselves, both as representation and as creation. Once again, this does 
not make of im-mundus a quasi-representational vitalist movement that 
knows no rest. Part of Nancy’s efforts is precisely to counteract this idea, 
and to propose instead the participation in the making of this subject-reject. 
This necessarily includes our participation in the making of this world and a 
non-messianic openness to what is radically unexpected or 
incommensurable.66 The former does not sublate the latter, and the latter is 
not a mystical prayer. The stance of the world is our stance, how we choose 
to conduct the world, for good or bad, not as multiplicity or individual 
singularities, but as people, not in an empty populist sense, but as a 
grouping67 ‘able’ to express anarchically an ‘us’ (im-mundus) with or against 
nature or earth, space or the universe, these empty totalities that 
momentarily and artificially demarcate our horizon. 
 
Obviously, the main problem with this vision is that, however much it 
flirts with communism in its attempt to derail the stubborn logic of 
equivalence itself (and therefore of the logic of both religion and capital), it 
does not put forward a conventional political plan of action. It is true that if 
one challenges Nancy’s thought on this topic, the result is obviously 
problematic. Indeed, the question that really needs to be addressed and 
that Nancy always eschews from answering, is this68: How can this im-
mundus be affected politically so as to prioritize mundus over immundus? In 
other words, how is one to respond to this demand for reason that ‘we’ (that 
is, im-mundus) impose on ourselves in a way that encourages the growth of 
the subject-world over and above its reject, and therefore, potentially, its 
very real annihilation? These questions are crucial because they do not 
simply ask for a political statement with a delusory potential achievement;69 
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they ask for the manner in which, according to Nancy, the liminal operation 
of im-mundus should really take place. After all, as Nancy himself 
recognizes, ‘one needs at least a modicum of representation: what or who 
do we want to be?’70 
 
Perhaps the problem with im-mundus is that it does not address the 
problematic of its embodiment and therefore of its enunciation seriously 
enough. This is not a criticism, but a way of finishing this reflection on 
Nancy’s im-mundus by taking it elsewhere. I am thinking here of 
Heidegger’s words about the fact that humankind is always already 
transposed into its own possibility and, as such, can never hold itself long 
enough in order to be able to understand how its own possibility actually 
‘transposes’ itself. In other words, and to use Nancy’s own vocabulary, the 
world can never properly hold its own stance; it is always prey to the 
incommensurable and therefore to a certain indeterminacy of form and 
content. Never matching our own ‘being thought,’ ‘we’—this heterogeneity—
can only therefore fail to capture, captivate, or control our own stance. Here 
is Heidegger’s memorable passage: 
 
‘Man is that inability to remain and is yet unable to leave his place. In 
projecting, the Da-sein in him constantly throws him into possibilities 
and thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this 
throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of 
occurrence… Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be 
mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus 
mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only 
where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the 
bliss of astonishment…’71 
 
If one transposes this passage and rethink all of the above, then one can 
only conclude that any attempt to make sense of im-mundus, is an attempt 
to absent ourselves from one’s own transposition into the possible. In other 
words, im-mundus cannot actually be understood because if we did, we 
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would absent ourselves not from ‘it’ as such, but from having been and from 
any futural projection. This does not imply the absence of yet another onto-
theological perspective, but the impossibility of extracting ourselves from 
what led us to the decision of understanding and the consequence of such 
a decision. Furthermore, the impossibility of eschewing the path that leads 
us to understand im-mundus and the task that stems from it effectively also 
prevents us from affecting it. Again, this does not relegate Nancy’s im-
mundus to the dustbin of philosophical ideas; this only highlights the 
difficulty of what he is asking us to achieve. 
 
Mistaking 
 
The other thing that Heidegger’s crucial passage highlights is, of 
course, the fact that, even if one could, any attempt to think im-mundus can 
only be mistaken. Why mistaken? It is mistaken because our inability to 
absent ourselves from im-mundus prevents us from being right about it. We 
are always already immersed in its creation/production. It is true that Nancy 
himself acknowledges the importance of the mistake when he writes, for 
example:  
 
‘Praxis is not measured by a given, predetermined Idea. Yet, it is not 
measured against nothing. Let’s try saying that it measures itself 
based on the Idea of what will be unable to saturate the Idea itself… At 
each possible point of [measurement], a mistake is not out of the 
question... To accept the risk is also part of the chance. Those, 
curiously, that take the risk of being mistaken leave open the greatest 
chance for the real chance.’72 
 
But how does one become one of those who take such a risk? Nancy 
remains silent. What is therefore lacking in Nancy’s work on im-mundus is 
perhaps the fact that its very writing is never enough an openly mistaken 
subject-reject. Again, this does not mean that Nancy is wrong. This simply 
means that im-mundus is effectively always already a mistake, because its 
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absencing never allows it to be rightly understood in its factuality. This is the 
only way one can think of our im-mundus, that is, seized by terror and 
astonishment, just as im-mundus (we) seize ourselves in our terrifying and 
astonishing absencing.  
 
The question we are left is then this: Once the error of our ways is held 
up each time as what partially makes us, could the political as a task to be 
accomplished finally begin? If the answer is yes, then a much more difficult 
task opens up ahead of us because it implies that ‘mistaking’ is also part of 
this im-mundus that we create/fabricate; part of this subject-reject that we 
are, and thus part of this very writing and reading. At the level of exegesis, 
we can probably say that it is precisely the error of Nancy’s statements 
about im-mundus or about this subject-reject that allows us to embody them 
and therefore risk yet more future mistakes. Indeed, with his mistaking 
comes a resistance against his thought; a resistance that gives thought 
another chance or opens up a new heterogeneity of contents that, properly 
speaking, knows no limit. Similarly, as a commentator, I’m no doubt 
mistaken here, but my mistakes allows for a resistance and a new 
indeterminate linking of phrase (by me or others), and thus to a new Nancy 
‘on’ the world. 
 
If we therefore hold the error of our ways as what makes im-mundus, 
then we also begin, more broadly, to resist against the world’s worst threats 
(pollution, unbridled greed, fundamentalisms, terrorism, overpopulation, 
genocide, and the list goes on). Our mistakes shape our resistance; it is 
what precisely breaks sense and renders it possible both as inevitable 
fabrication (or repetition) and as creation: the stances of our world. Nancy’s 
political thought lies precisely in this world forming, that is, this (for now) 
major global mistake that defies belief and yet forces us to resist, thus 
giving us a new im-mundus, one yet again allergic to any definition, 
delimitation, or end. And this is what we have/are: a world enhanced and 
polluted, heavy with a burdensome history of extreme violence, and dizzy 
by its inability to come up with a global strategy that would secure a better 
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future for all. We carry these stances without any form of support or firm 
basis. These stances are our transient ‘systasis,’73 this political-standing-
together that makes us quiver between sur-vival (world-forming) and de-
struction (globalization). It is high time we assume our subject-reject, the 
errors of our way that make and shape our future. 
 
‘This world, whose world is it? It’s no longer God’s, it’s no longer 
Man’s, it’s no longer Science’s. So? It’s ours. What does that mean? 
Ours… if you’ll allow me to make a joke using free-association: Le 
Nôtre was the name of Louis XIV’s gardener, who designed the park at 
Versailles… Could our [notre] world be a royal park? Must it be a 
wasteland? Or will we be able to create a waste-park?’74 
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